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ABSTRACT
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been
shown that dynamic spectrum access can signi¯cantly im-
prove spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is impor-
tant to incentivize the primary license holders to open up
their under-utilized spectrum for sharing. In this paper we
present a secondary spectrum market where a primary li-
cense holder can sell access to its unused or under-used spec-
trum resources in the form of certain ¯ne-grained spectrum-
space-time unit. Secondary wireless service providers can
purchase such contracts to deploy new service, enhance their
existing service, or deploy ad hoc service to meet °ash crowds
demand. Within the context of this market, we investigate
how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spec-
trum resources so that the primary license holder's revenue
is maximized. We begin by classifying a number of alterna-
tive auction formats in terms of spectrum demand. We then
study a speci¯c auction format where secondary wireless ser-
vice providers have demands for ¯xed locations (cells). We
propose an optimal auction based on the concept of virtual
valuation. Assuming the knowledge of valuation distribu-
tions, the optimal auction uses the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism to maximize the expected revenue while
enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational com-
plexity, we further design a truthful suboptimal auction with
polynomial time complexity. It uses a monotone allocation
and critical value payment to enforce truthfulness. Simula-
tion results show that this suboptimal auction can generate
stable expected revenue.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer Com-
munication Networks
General Terms
Algorithm, Design, Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Radio spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource in the pro-
vision of wireless telecommunications services. Acquisition
of a spectrum license is the very ¯rst, and also one of the
most di±cult and costly procedures in the development and
deployment of any new wireless service as well as its market
entry. Because of the externality in spectrum usage such
as electromagnetic interference, the allocation of spectrum
resources has been strictly coordinated and regulated.
Traditionally, spectrum allocation has been done in a cen-
tralized, static, and wholesale fashion, where long-term (on
the order of 10s of years) spectrum leases/contracts are sold
covering very large geographical regions (see for instance the
regional spectrum allocation in the recent FCC's 700 MHz
auction, and the 27GHz allocation in Australia). As a re-
sult, the type of buyers who can meaningfully participate in
this type of allocation is limited, due to the large amount of
capitals needed.
Under this type of static allocation, there is increasing
evidence that spectrum resources are not being e±ciently
utilized [1], and that there exists abundant spectrum oppor-
tunity currently unexploited within licensed bands. At the
same time, wireless devices are enjoying ever greater capa-
bility to detect spectrum availability and °exibility to adjust
operating frequencies [2]. These observations have led to a
push for the original license holders and operators, a pri-
mary example being TV broadcasters
1, to open up access
to secondary unlicensed users [3], so as to improve spectrum
utilization, a concept known as dynamic spectrum access [4].
With dynamic spectrum access, secondary unlicensed users
may take advantage of (instantaneous) spectrum opportuni-
ties that exist in spectrum owned by a primary user. This
has motivated a large number of recent studies on how a sec-
ondary user should perform opportunistic spectrum access
and how primary and secondary users could co-exist [5,6].
2
There are several unique challenges in such a new spec-
trum sharing paradigm. Firstly, we believe that unless there
1Indeed the FCC on November 4, 2008 approved unlicensed
wireless devices that operate in the empty white space be-
tween TV channels, after four years of e®ort.
2In this paper, we use the terms primary license holder,
primary user and sellers interchangeably, while we use the
terms secondary wireless service providers, secondary users
and buyers interchangeably.Goverment
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Figure 1: Spectrum market structure.
is su±cient incentive, current licensed spectrum holders are
likely to be reluctant to allow open access, and trying to
achieve this purely through policymaking and regulation
could be problematic. At the same time, we envision the
emergence of various secondary users whose spectrum needs
may be highly variable, sporadic and short lived, and limited
to speci¯c geographical regions.
The above observations have motivated us to consider a
market mechanism particularly targeted at spectrum access
relationship between primary users and secondary users (ser-
vice providers), as shown in Figure 1. In this paper, we
present a framework in which these secondary users could
tap into unused or under-used spectrum bands currently
held by primary users, while the latter can generate addi-
tional pro¯t in the process. One of the key features of this
market is that the spectrum contracts cover relatively small
geographic regions, such that purchase of one contract may
preclude the sales of the same spectrum bands in neighbor-
ing regions, while spectrum can be reused in non-interfering
regions.
We will use auction as the form of trading in this system
and will refer to this as a secondary spectrum market for
spectrum access. There are a number of desired properties
associated with such an auction system, including truthful-
ness, high revenue for the sellers and high spectrum resource
utilization for the system as a whole. As we will demon-
strate, our framework addresses all these aspects. It has to
be mentioned that auction methods have been quite exten-
sively used in the context of spectrum access and sharing,
see e.g., [7]. More on related work is discussed in Section
8. Our work is di®erent from in that we focus on revenue
generation of truthful auctions whiling considering the in-
terference nature of wireless communication.
We begin by presenting a number of potential bidding
formats in this framework. We then focus on one particular
implementation of the system corresponding to the following
type of bidding format: Each buyer is interested in purchas-
ing access to a certain number of channels in each of a ¯xed
set of cells (i.e., geographical locations); their requests are
strict (i.e., cannot be partially satis¯ed). We design auction
mechanisms that maximize expected revenue while ensuring
truthful bidding from buyers. Assuming that the buyers'
valuation distributions are known to the seller, we ¯rst de-
sign an optimal auction based on using the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism to enforce truthfulness and maxi-
mize expected revenue. Here we adopt the concept of virtual
valuation instead of the buyers' original value, which is the
surplus of the original valuation and a function of valuation
distribution. This method is widely used in conventional
economical analysis. It can be shown that maximizing total
virtual valuation is equivalent to maximizing expected rev-
enue. However, the winner determining problem with the
VCG mechanism in the graph structured resource is a NP-
Hard problem. Therefore, we also provide a suboptimal auc-
tion in terms of revenue generation, but that addresses the
complexity of maximization computation. This is achieved
by using a greedy-like allocation and a critical value based
payment rule, which together induce truthful bidding. Its
low complexity makes this auction much more practical for
spectrum auctions on a shorter time scale. We examine the
e®ectiveness of this method via numerical results.
The main contribution of this paper is as follows:
1. We investigate the revenue generation problem for pri-
mary users in a secondary spectrum auction market,
where truthful bidding and interference constraints are
satis¯ed.
2. Under the Baysian setting, we use the VCG auction to
maximize the expected revenue by maximizing the as-
sociated virtual valuation, under the interference con-
straints. We also propose a suboptimal auction to re-
duce the complexity for practical purpose.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we characterize the special challenges in a secondary
spectrum market. Section 3 formally presents the spectrum
auction market. We then consider a speci¯c case in Section
4. Sections 5 and 6 present two types of auctions, respec-
tively. Experimental results are shown in Section 7. Section
8 reviews related work. We conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. CHARACTERIZATIONOFSECONDARY
SPECTRUM MARKET
In this section we describe at a conceptual level of sec-
ondary spectrum market and characterize its uniqueness which
makes it di®erent from traditional (primary) spectrum mar-
ket and motivates our research. As pointed out in the in-
troduction, our objective is to provide a market and trad-
ing mechanism for both primary license holders (seller) and
secondary wireless service providers (buyers). Speci¯cally,
through such a mechanism the former can pro¯t from sell-
ing shorter-term (e.g., weeks or months) spectrum licenses/
contracts, while their own licenses, issued in the traditional
spectrum acquisition procedure, are typically valid for a
much longer period. Such short-term licenses are on a much
¯ner granularity in terms of the amount of spectrum and the
area coverage each such license applies to, which is di®erent
from the traditional, coarse-grained spectrum assignment.
This mechanism provides a clear incentive for the primary
spectrum holders to allow dynamic access to under-usedspectrum opportunity. It will also undoubtedly improve the
overall spectrum utilization and e±ciency.
2.1 Revenue Generation
We ¯rst note that in a traditional primary spectrum mar-
ket, the government's key objective is to e±ciently assign
the spectrum resource to users with the greatest valuation,
so that social welfare may be maximized. By contrast, in
a secondary spectrum market, incentive becomes a critical
issue. Many primary users are private companies driven by
self-interest. Their spectrum bands are obtained via tradi-
tional spectrum auctions, at (sometimes signi¯cant) costs.
Their natural goal is to maximize their own pro¯t. With-
out su±cient incentive, primary users are likely reluctant to
open their spectrum bands to other users.
It follows that primary users, in opening access to their
spectrum bands, will try to optimize their revenue by using
appropriate allocation and pricing rules. This is the main
issue we try to address in this paper. In subsequent sections
we will primarily focus on using auction as the underlying
trading mechanism, where there is only one spectrum holder
and potentially many spectrum buyers.
2.2 Finer Spectrum Reuse
There are two key assumptions underlying the proposed
spectrum market. The ¯rst one is that this primary license
holder has fairly accurate information on the spectrum usage
within its band and its coverage. Such information may be
obtained from statistics collected during operation or exten-
sive spectral measurement. From such information it may
deduce that certain sections of its spectrum in certain re-
gions within its coverage during certain periods of time (or
time of day or days of the week, etc.) are grossly under-
utilized, and therefore would like to lease them out for pro¯t.
A second assumption is that the e®ect time of contracts in
the market are at least on the order of hours, rather than
seconds or less. Two cases can be identi¯ed further: (1)
the primary users do not show up during the whole period
of the contracts, so secondary wireless service providers can
use the spectrum freely [8]. (2) There are some primary ac-
tivities. Secondary wireless service providers must obey cer-
tain rules to avoid harmful interference, which many studies
on opportunistic spectrum access on the packet level seek
to exploit [9]. However, in designing auctioning mechanisms
we need not be concerned with the distinction between these
two cases.
These spectrum opportunities can be location-dependent;
highly populated urban areas may only have limited spec-
trum to spare while vast white spaces exist over some rural
areas. They can also be time-dependent. For a certain area,
more spectrum may be available in one period of time than
the other. With a collection of such spectrum opportuni-
ties, the primary license holder can now formally de¯ne a
number of spectrum-space-time blocks/units, and generate
a contract for each of them.
3. SECONDARY SPECTRUM AUCTION
FRAMEWORK
In this section we describe in detail our spectrum auction
framework. The design of the framework has to take into
account a number of objectives, including spectrum usage
e±ciency, °exible spectrum requests and achievable auction
properties including truth-revelation and revenue maximiza-
tion. While some of these objectives are certainly correlated,
in general they cannot all be achieved at the same time. Our
framework consists of the following elements: spectrum re-
source, bidding language and auction objective.
3.1 Spectrum Resource
Radio spectrum is a special resource with multi-dimensional
properties (space, time and frequency) [10] [11]. Within the
context of this paper, we will ignore the time dimension by
assuming that time is partitioned into periods and that the
auction under consideration is limited to one such period.
Implicitly, spectrum demand (bids submitted) and availabil-
ity (supply of contracts) remain constant within a period.
With this simpli¯cation, the primary license holder orga-
nizes its spectrum availability into certain frequency-space
units.
In general it is up to the primary license holder to decide
on a sensible and potentially pro¯table way to organize its
spectrum availability into concrete, sellable frequency-space
units. For instance, it may choose to ¯rst divide its spec-
trum into groups based on di®erent spectral characteristics,
and hold auctions separately for each group. At the same
time, the primary license holder also partitions its coverage
area, where there are available frequency bands, into cells.
This cell partition process may heavily depend on regional
geographic and demographic properties. It is very likely that
cells will have di®erent sizes. This process also depends on
the spectral characteristics. For example, if we consider the
TV band channels, the size of each cell can have a radius of
10 to 100 km.
For the purpose of our analysis, we will focus on a single
spectrum group that is divided into a number of bands of
equal bandwidth. We assume that for this set of frequency
bands the corresponding cells are given. In some of those
cells spectrum may be reused while in others (neighboring
cells) we must use di®erent bands. Each secondary spectrum
contract speci¯es a pair of frequency band (i.e., channel) and
cell.
These assumptions allow us to represent the spatial reuse
relationship of cells using an interference graph, where each
node corresponds to a single cell, and an edge between two
nodes indicates that the connecting cells interfere with each
other when the same band is used in both. The auction
market essentially tries to achieve the following: through a
bidding and pricing process the system determines on this
graph which frequency bands are used in which cell by which
buyer. Regardless of other elements of the auction market,
the resulting frequency allocation has to be interference free,
i.e., no two neighboring nodes can be allocated the same
channel.
3.2 Bidding Language
Buyers can express di®erent formats of spectrum request
depending on the type of application scenarios involved and
their own interest. Below we list several representative spec-
trum request formats. We use Bi to denote the submitted
bid of buyer i, which takes on di®erent format in each case.
3.2.1 Total Channels in All Cells
Each buyer submits its bid Bi, indicating its total re-
quested number of channels across all cells, and its bidding
price. In this case, buyers care more about the total amountof spectrum it can get; it does not care where and at what
density the allocated spectrum lies. In some situations, the
requirement can be partially accepted, while in other cases,
the requirements are strict.
An example where this bidding format makes sense is a
wireless service provider with fairly widely deployed infras-
tructure. It has a large overall spectrum demand and wants
to acquire as much spectrum as possible regardless of the
locations and spectrum distributions.
3.2.2 Cells and Channels per Cell
Each buyer submits its bid Bi indicating the requested
number of cells, the requested number of channels in each
cell, and the total bidding price. Both strict and partial
requirements are possible.
A motivating example for this format is a wireless service
provider with well deployed infrastructure over a whole re-
gion, and its spectrum demand for each sub-region tends to
be uniform. Due to practical issues such as a budget con-
straint, it would like to have some cells upgraded but does
not care which cells these are. Another case is when a wire-
less service provider wants to deploy new services in a region
with service coverage requirement (e.g., coverage portion of
the whole region) and spectrum density requirement in each
cell.
3.2.3 Speciﬁc Cells and Corresponding Channels
Each buyer requests a certain number of channels in ¯xed
cells and a total bidding price. Both strict and partial re-
quirements are possible.
This case is suitable when the buyers have particular in-
terest in speci¯c locations. This possibility of preference can
be easily understood when a provider considers where to ini-
tiate certain services with a limited budget (e.g., downtown
vs. suburbs). This also applies to scenarios where a ser-
vice provider is bound to speci¯c areas and locations due to
practical or regulatory constraints.
3.3 Desired Properties of Spectrum Auction
From the seller's point of view, the spectrum auction ide-
ally should ful¯ll certain objectives, such as revenue gener-
ation, truthful biding and computational e±ciency.
3.3.1 Revenue
As already mentioned, the spectrum seller naturally would
like to maximize its potential revenue given the bids from
buyers. If the seller does not care about whether the bids
are truthful, then this leads to a revenue maximization prob-
lem. Obviously, the price charged for winning buyers must
be no greater than their bidding price. An e±cient resource
allocation algorithm is then needed for the revenue maxi-
mization.
3.3.2 Truthfulness
The seller may also desire truthful bids from buyers. Truth-
telling prevents market manipulation, and eases the bidding
of buyers since bidding with their true value is the best strat-
egy in theory. Single-unit second price auction and multiple-
unit Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are the typ-
ical rules to enforce truthfulness.
3.3.3 Computational Efﬁciency
In some situations when the amount of resources is large
or the time granularity is small, the auction needs to be
e±cient in that the computational complexity needs to be
low to work in real-time or near real-time. For example,
even though the VCG mechanism can enforce truthfulness,
its computational complexity is high in general.
4. AUCTION MODEL FOR REQUEST OF
SPECIFIC CELLS AND CORRESPOND-
ING CHANNELS
We now focus on a particular spectrum auction bidding
format mentioned in the previous part, the Speci¯c Cells and
Corresponding Channels format. The buyers have spectrum
demand for particular cells and a certain number of chan-
nels for each cell (demand for each cell may be di®erent).
The auction is a single sealed bid auction. Strict request
is adopted here, which means the winners get either all re-
quested spectrum or nothing.
We ¯rst describe our assumptions and notations for the
spectrum auction. The seller o®ers K channels covering a
certain region. The channels have uniform characteristics,
therefore buyers will not di®erentiate between channels. The
region is partitioned into small cells. If adjacent cells use the
same channel, they will interfere with each other. The space
is represented by a graph G = (V;E), where V denotes the
set of cells with M = jVj, and E = fejj0gM£M denotes the
interference relation among cells, with ejj0 = 1 indicating
there is interference between cell j and j
0, and 0 otherwise.
The graph G is assumed to be the same for all the channels.
There are N buyers participating in the spectrum auc-
tion. Each of them submits a bid Bi = (di;bi), where di
is the spectrum demand and bi is the bidding price for the
submitted demand. Here di = (d
1
i;:::;d
M
i ) is a demand
vector with d
j
i representing the number of channels buyer i
demands in cell j.
We follow the conventional Bayesian setting in economics.
We use vi to denote the privately known valuation of buyer
i for spectrum resource di. We assume the exact valua-
tion vi is private information, but the distribution Fi from
which vi is drawn is known to the seller; while buyers have
no knowledge of each other's valuation distribution. The
corresponding density function is fi =
d
dzFi(z), which is
continuous. Such information can be based on the records
of history transactions.
Given the bids from buyers, the seller computes the out-
come consisting of a winner determining vector x = (x1;:::;xN)
and charging prices p = (p1;:::;pN), where xi = 1 means
buyer i wins and is allocated with its whole spectrum request
while xi = 0 is for no allocation for buyer i at all, pi is the
amount of money buyer i is intended to pay the seller. The
utility obtained by buyer i is indicated by ui = vixi ¡ pi.
As we have mentioned earlier, even though in reality a
winning bidder may or may not have exclusive use to the
channels he gains access to, i.e., he may or may not have to
share with the primary user (seller), the above auction model
does not distinguish between the two and can be applied
equally in either case. This is because this model does not
concern the ¯ner details of the terms of usage speci¯ed in
the contracts, and by submitting bid Bi a buyer agrees to
abide by such terms, whatever they are.
The winner determination vector x should be associated
with a feasible allocation, which is denoted by a vector
A = (A1;:::;AN), where Ai = fa
jk
i gM£K is an alloca-
tion matrix for buyer i with a
jk
i = 1 meaning channel kat cell j is allocated to buyer i and a
jk
i = 0 otherwise. It
is up to the seller to allocate the spectrum without mutual
interference, i.e., the same channel is not allocated to cells
with connecting edges. Formally, the constraints for a fea-
sible winner determination and its allocation vector A can
be expressed as follows:
Allocation Constraints:
K X
k=1
a
jk
i = xid
j
i; j = 1;:::;M; i = 1;:::;N (1)
N X
i=1
a
jk
i · 1; j = 1;:::;M; k = 1;:::;K (2)
N X
i=1
a
jk
i ¢
N X
i=1
a
j0k
i = 0; 8ejj0 = 1; k = 1;:::;K (3)
where (1) ensures the allocation for buyers is strict, (2) in-
dicates that a given channel in a given cell can only be al-
located to at most one buyer, and (3) is the interference
constraint.
Definition 1. An auction is truthful if and only if buyer
i's (expected) utility of bidding its true valuation vi is at least
its (expected) utility of bidding any other value bi,
ui(vi;b¡i) ¸ ui(bi;b¡i): (4)
The expected revenue of the primary user is given by:
E[¼] = E[
N X
i=1
pixi]; (5)
where the valuation vi follows a known distribution Fi(vi),
the winner determination x subject to the Allocation Con-
straints, and the auction is truthful.
We use b¡i = (b1;:::;bi¡1;bi+1;:::;bN) to represent the
vector of bidding prices without buyer i's bid, and also sim-
ilar for x¡i.
In the next two sections, we will present two auction de-
signs: an optimal auction with high computational complex-
ity, and a computational e±cient auction with suboptimal
revenue.
5. OPTIMAL AUCTION
In this section, we present an optimal auction which max-
imizes the expected revenue. We use the conventional eco-
nomics approach of Bayesian optimal mechanism design,
where it is assumed that the valuations of buyers are drawn
from distributions known to the seller. We base our auc-
tion on Myerson's optimal mechanism, which is a truthful
mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected rev-
enue. With the knowledge of valuation distribution, the
notion of virtual valuation is de¯ned, which is essentially a
reservation price for each buyer. We apply VCG mechanism
on the virtual valuation, which generates the maximum ex-
pected revenue while enforcing truthfulness. However, the
computational complexity is shown to be high.
5.1 Virtual Valuation
We ¯rst present the concept of virtual valuation from [12].
Definition 2. The virtual valuation of buyer i with val-
uation vi is
Ái(vi) = vi ¡
1 ¡ Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
: (6)
We assume the distribution of valuation vi satisfy the
monotone hazard rate assumption:
fi(z)
1¡F(z) is monotone non-
decreasing. With such an assumption, the virtual valuation
function is a monotone non-decreasing function. In doing so
the mechanism discriminates the buyers: associating high
reservation price with bidders with high valuation distribu-
tion while low reservation price with bidders with low valu-
ation distribution.
5.2 VCG-based Auction
With the above virtual valuations, the revenue maximiza-
tion problem can be solved with the well known VCG mech-
anism: the winner determination is to maximize the sum of
winning bids and the payment from each buyer is the op-
portunity cost that its presence introduces to all the other
players. The detailed auction is as follows:
1. Given the bids fBig and fFig, compute virtual bids
B
0
i = (d
0
i;b
0
i) where d
0
i = di and b
0
i = Ái(bi).
2. Use VCG mechanism on the virtual bids to get x
0 and
p
0.
VCG mechanism includes an allocation to maximize
the virtual valuation of all the users:
max
x0
N X
i=1
Ái(bi)x
0
i
s:t: Allocation Constraints:
(7)
VCG mechanism results in the payment:
p
0
i = max
x¡i
X
j6=i
xjÁj(bj) ¡ max
x
X
j6=i
xjÁj(bj): (8)
3. The ¯nal allocation x is set to x
0 and the charged price
p is set with pi = Á
¡1
i (p
0
i) for each winner and pi = 0
for each loser.
5.3 Properties of the Optimal Auction
We now analyze the properties of the optimal auction in
terms of truthfulness, revenue and complexity. It is known
that an auction is truthful if the allocation algorithm of this
auction is monotone while the price charged of a winner is
a critical value [13]:
1. Monotone allocation: for each b¡i, if buyer i wins by
bidding bi, then it also wins by bidding b
0
i + ± with
± > 0.
2. Critical value: monotone allocation implies there is a
critical value v
c
i for each buyer such that if buyer i
bids higher than v
c
i it wins and if i bids lower than v
c
i
it loses.
We show that the allocation of the optimal auction is
indeed a monotone allocation despite the interference con-
straints from spectrum resource. The requirement of satis-
fying the interference constraints is not present in existing
literatures of auction design [13].
Lemma 1. The winner determination x induced by vir-
tual valuation maximization is monotone non-decreasing, if
distribution function Fi(z) satis¯es the condition that
1¡Fi(z)
fi(z)
is non-increasing.Proof. Suppose x is a winner determination vector which
maximizes the sum of virtual valuations S =
P
x Ái(bi)xi
subject to the Allocation Constraints, with buyer i is al-
located with its request di, i.e., xi = 1. Suppose buyer
i's bidding price is increased from bi to bi + ± with ± > 0
while the other buyers keep their bidding prices b¡i un-
changed. With the assumption of monotone hazard rate, we
have Ái(bi + ±) > Ái(bi). Then to maximize S, it must be
the case that x
0
i = 1.
According to the pricing rule of the optimal auction, i.e.,
Equation (8), the (virtual) payment for a winner does not
depend on its bidding price, which means it is a critical
value. Therefore the requirement of critical value is satis¯ed
immediately.
Lemma 2. If buyer i wins, its payment pi is a critical
value.
From Lemma 1 and 2, we can get the following result:
Theorem 1. The optimal auction is truthful in that each
buyer maximizes its utility by submitting its truthful valua-
tion.
Proof. Let vi be the truthful bidding, and bi the bidding
such that bi 6= vi.
In the ¯rst case, if buyer i loses by bidding bi, then its
utility ui(bi) = 0. While bidding vi brings it nonnegative
utility ui(vi) ¸ 0, with ui(vi) = 0 for losing and ui(vi) =
vi ¡ pi ¸ 0 for winning.
In the second case, buyer i wins by bidding bi. If buyer i
also wins with vi, the utilities are the same, since the pay-
ment of critical value is the same, i.e., ui(vi) = ui(bi) =
vi ¡pi. If buyer i loses with vi, according to the monotonic-
ity property, it must be the case of vi · pi · bi. Then the
utility for bidding bi is negative, i.e., ui(bi) = vi ¡ pi < 0.
In both cases, bidding other than truth valuation is not
better than bidding truth valuation.
The proof is similar to the one in [13].
For the expected revenue, it is shown in [12] that for any
truthful mechanism and ¯xed bids b¡i of all bidders except
for bidder i, the expected payment from a bidder i satis¯es:
E[pi(bi)] = E[Ái(bi)xi(bi)]: (9)
Therefore, to maximize the expected revenue of a truthful
auction, it su±ces to maximize the total virtual valuations.
Theorem 2. The optimal auction maximizes the expected
revenue.
Since the expected revenue of any truthful mechanism is
equal to the expected total virtual valuation, and the opti-
mal auction is indeed maximizing the total virtual valuation,
the optimal auction maximizes the expected revenue.
Theorem 3. The VCG-based optimal auction is NP-hard.
Proof. We check the winner determining problem in the
optimal auction. For the simple case that there is one sin-
gle channel and each buyer's submission contains one single
cell, the virtual valuation maximization is a weighted inde-
pendent set problem, which is an NP-Hard problem.
Algorithm 1 Suboptimal Allocation(B
0;G)
1: x0
i = 0;8i 2 N
2: Avail(j) = K;8j 2 V
3: t = True
4: while B0 6= ? do
5: i = Next(B0)
6: for j = 1 to M do
7: if Avail(j) ¸ d
j
i then
8: Assign(i;d
j
i)
9: else
10: t = False
11: end if
12: end for
13: if t == True then
14: x0
i = 1
15: Update(Avail)
16: end if
17: end while
6. SUBOPTIMAL AUCTION
The VCG-based optimal auction introduced in the pre-
vious section is able to generate maximum expected rev-
enue, but the computational complexity is prohibitive for
large scale spectrum market and real-time spectrum trading.
Therefore, in this section, we further propose a more com-
putationally e±cient auction. The low complexity comes at
the price of some reduction in revenue, but as we will show
this suboptimal auction preserves the truthful property.
6.1 Non-VCG Auction
One intuitive approach to address the issue of complexity
is to use an approximate algorithm for the winner determi-
nation problem and a VCG-like pricing algorithm. However,
it has been reported that such an approach cannot enforce
truthful bidding in general. We therefore resort to one type
of non-VCG auction [14], which also consists of three steps:
bid ranking, winner determination along with spectrum al-
location, and payment calculation. This will be referred to
as the suboptimal auction. The complete auction rule is de-
scribed as follows:
1. Compute virtual bids B
0
i = (d
0
i;b
0
i) as in the optimal
auction: d
0
i = di and b
0
i = Ái(bi).
2. Use the non-VCG mechanism on the virtual bids to
get x
0 and p
0, which includes:
a) In the ¯rst step of bid ranking, the bids are sorted
by some criterion: r(i) = r(d
0
i;b
0
i). The sorted list with
deceasing order is denoted by L. Di®erent rankings
can be used here as long as it satis¯es monotonicity.
In this paper, we use the metric of average virtual val-
uation per requested cell: r(i) =
b0
i
si(d0
i), where si(d
0
i)
is the total number of demanded channels in all cells:
si(d
0
i) =
PM
j=1 d
j
i.
b) In the second step, a greedy algorithm generates an
allocation with the skeleton shown in Algorithm 6.1.
In each iteration, the algorithm checks the next bid on
the list L. It iteratively checks the demand for each
cell in the order of cell index: during the iteration, it
allocates the demanded number of channels in the cell
in the order of channel index if there are enough chan-
nels in the cell, and updates the channel availability inAlgorithm 2 Critical Buyer(B
0;G;i)
1: B00 = B0nfB0
ig
2: Avail(j) = K;8j 2 V
3: W = ?
4: p0
i = 0
5: t1 = t2 = True
6: while B00 6= ? do
7: c = Next(B00)
8: for j = 1 to M do
9: if Avail(c) ¸ d
j
c then
10: Assign(c;d
j
c)
11: else
12: t1 = False
13: end if
14: end for
15: if t1 == True then
16: W = W [ fcg
17: Update(Avail)
18: for j = 1 to M do
19: if Avail(j) ¸ d
j
i then
20: Assign(i;d
j
i)
21: else
22: t2 = False
23: end if
24: end for
25: if t2 == False then
26: return c
27: end if
28: end if
29: end while
30: return Null
neighboring cells. The algorithm grants the whole re-
quest of bid i if it does not con°ict with any allocation
previously granted (i.e., the Allocation Constraint). If
there is con°iction, it denies (i.e., does not grant) the
bid.
c) In the third, payment step, a buyer i pays the
amount according to a critical buyer c(i) such that:
if buyer i's bid satis¯es r(i) > r(c(i)), buyer i wins; if
r(i) < r(c(i)), it loses. The critical buyer c(i) for buyer
i can be determined by Algorithm 2. Intuitively, the
algorithm ¯nds the ¯rst buyer who makes buyer i's de-
mand unsatis¯ed. The virtual payment is the average
virtual valuation per cell of buyer c(i) multiplied by
the requested amount of buyer i: p
0
i = r(c(i)) ¢ si(d
0
i).
3. The ¯nal allocation x is set to x
0 and the charged price
p is set to pi = Á
¡1
i (p
0
i) for each winner and pi = 0 for
each loser.
Note that the allocation algorithm is di®erent from typical
greedy algorithms in that the allocation order in the former
is ¯xed in the beginning and will not change during the
whole allocation process.
6.2 Properties
We examine properties of the above auction in terms of
truthfulness and complexity. The result of revenue is given
in the next section.
Lemma 3. The allocation resulting from the suboptimal
auction is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose we increase buyer i's bid from bi to bi+±
with ± > 0. By our de¯nition of bid ranking, we have r(bi +
Figure 2: Cellular topology with 25 cells.
±) ¸ r(bi). Denote the lists for bi and bi + ± as L and L
0,
respectively. If we compare the lists L and L
0 obtained, we
see that they di®er only in that i's bid may have been moved
up the list by changing from bi to bi + ±. The allocation
algorithm performs (i.e., grants or denies bids) in exactly the
same way on L and L
0 until it reaches i's bid in L
0. Assume
i's bid is denied on L
0, which implies that there are not
enough channels among i's requested cells, either because
i's request is not feasible, or because some other bids on
L
0 before i's are granted with con°icting cells (collocated or
interfering). The same reasoning also applies to i's bid on
L and thus it would also be denied. Now assume i's bid
on L is granted, which means that i's bid is feasible and
bids granted before i (if any) leave enough channels in i's
requested cells. Again this is also true for i's bid on L
0 and
thus i's bid is also granted on L
0.
Lemma 4. Each winner in the suboptimal auction pays
the its critical value v
c
i according to c(i).
Proof. This is obvious since the virtual payment p
0
i is
based on the critical buyer c(i) according to Algorithm 2.
With the mapping between value and virtual value, the ¯nal
payment is also a critical value.
With Lemmas 3 and 4, we obtain:
Theorem 4. The suboptimal auction is truthful.
The proof is similar to the truthfulness proof in the pre-
vious section.
Theorem 5. The suboptimal auction has a polynomial-
time complexity. It runs in time O(NlogN + MNKjEj),
where jEj is the number of edges in the graph G, M is the
number of cells, N is the number of bidders, and K is the
number of channels auctioned.
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we use experiment results to evaluate the
performance of the proposed auctions. We use a cellular
system-like topology shown in Figure 2. There are 25 cells
with equal size. The number of buyers is ¯xed at 5. The in-
terference range of a cell is limited to its immediate neighbor-
hood. Each buyer requests at most one channel in any cell in
the topology, and each buyer's valuation for its demand fol-
lows either the uniform distribution F(z) = z in the range of
(0, 1], or the exponential distribution F(z) = 1 ¡ e
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Figure 3: (Uniform distribution) Comparison between the suboptimal auction, optimal auction and truthful auction in terms
of: (a) revenue (b) spectrum utilization (c) revenue vs. spectrum utilization
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Number of Channels
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
Suboptimal
Optimal
Truthful
(a) Revenue
0 5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Number of Channels
S
p
e
c
t
r
u
m
 
U
t
i
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
Suboptimal
Optimal
Truthful
(b) Spectrum utilization
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Spectrum Utilization
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
Suboptimal
Truthful
(c) Revenue vs. Spectrum utilization
Figure 4: (Exponential distribution) Comparison between the suboptimal auction, optimal auction and truthful auction in
terms of (a) revenue (b) spectrum utilization (c) revenue vs. spectrum utilization
¸ = 1. For each random realization of demands, results are
averaged over 100 runs to obtain the expected results for
di®erent biddings. The ¯nal results are averaged over 100
randomly generated demands. The results are presented as
the number of channels available for auction increases.
We compare the performance of the suboptimal auction,
optimal auction and another auction (labeled as truthful in
the ¯gures). The third auction is a truthful auction without
considering the valuation distribution: it is similar to the
suboptimal auction but it uses valuation instead of virtual
valuation. We refer to this auction as the truthful auction.
A special case of this auction where each buyer can only
request a single location is discussed in [15].
We ¯rst consider the uniform distribution. As shown in
Figure 3(a), the suboptimal auction and optimal auction
outperform the truthful auction in terms of revenue. The
truthful auction's revenue su®ers signi¯cant degradation as
spectrum supply increases and eventually decreases to zero.
This is because when supply increases, the number of losers
decreases, and in turn payments from winners also decreases.
In contrast, the suboptimal and optimal auction generate
stable revenue as the spectrum supply increases. This is
due to the reservation e®ect of virtual valuation. This reser-
vation is clearly shown in Figures 3(b) and 3(c): as shown,
the suboptimal can generate more revenue than the truthful
auction with equal amount of allocated spectrum resources.
Further more, the performance of suboptimal auction is ap-
proaching the optimal auction. Considering the lower com-
plexity, the suboptimal auction is more preferable.
Figure 4 displays the results from using the exponential
distribution, which are similar to the uniform one. We con-
clude from these results that the suboptimal auction is a
good candidate in terms of revenue generation.
We present the social welfare, which is de¯ned as the total
valuation of the winners:
PN
i=1 vixi. We only compare the
social welfare of suboptimal auction with the one of VCG
auction (with uniform distribution of valuation), considering
the similar results of suboptimal and optimal auction. VCG
auction is known to maximize the social welfare. As shown
in Figure 5, there exist a gap between the social welfare of
suboptimal and VCG auction, since the spectrum resource
is not fully allocated to buyers with suboptimal auction.
Therefore, the spectrum holder's revenue maximization is
at the cost of degradation of social welfare.
We also tested the auctions in terms of certain properties
of spectrum requests. Speci¯cally, we consider two types
of requests: scattered requests and clustered requests. In
both cases, the number of total demanded channels in each
cell is the same. For scattered requests, the request of each
buyer is scattered over the entire region. For clustered re-0 5 10 15 20
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Figure 5: Social welfare for suboptimal auction and VCG
auction.
quests, the request of each buyer is clustered within a small
region while the location of such a small region is random.
As shown in Figure 6, the suboptimal auction outperforms
the truthful auction in terms of revenue for both requests.
Furthermore, with clustered requests, the revenue decreases
because mutual interference limits the allocation and less of
buyer's requests are satis¯ed.
8. RELATED WORK
General auction theory has been studied for decades. Ef-
¯cient auctions, e.g, VCG based auction, are known to max-
imize social welfare. Optimal auctions [12] target maximiz-
ing revenue, a concept used in this paper. However, the
auctioned resource here is not a single object, but a group
of cell and channel resource with mutual interference re-
lationship. Complexity issues of VCG auction are studied
in [14,16] which target social welfare. We extend them into
the graph structured resource and use them to address the
expected revenue issue.
It has long been recognized that compared to approaches
such as comparative hearings and lotteries, market-based
mechanisms are more promising and potentially far more ef-
¯cient for spectrum allocation. There are comprehensive lit-
eratures related to the traditional spectrum auction [17,18].
We emphasize however that these spectrum auctions aim at
allocations on a much bigger scale than that considered in
this paper. More particularly, the interference and spatial
reuse characteristic of spectrum are not considered in those
works.
Several studies within the context of spectrum sharing
consider the unique characteristic of spectrum resources.
[15] proposes a general spectrum auction framework con-
sidering the interference relationship in spectrum spatial
reuse. A strategy proof spectrum auction market is pro-
posed and high spectrum utilization is achieved. The in-
tended buyers in this market are end users (transmitters)
or clustered groups of users, each is only interested in spec-
trum availability in its own ¯xed location. [19] proposes a
multi-winner auction to optimize spectrum e±ciency and
prevent collusion, while the truthful bidding is compromised.
[20] proposes approximation algorithms to approach the op-
timal revenue for spectrum holder subject to interference
constraints. However, they do not consider the truthful-
ness of buyers. [21] uses auction to allocate transmit power
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Figure 6: Comparison for scattered and clustered requests:
(a) revenue (b) spectrum utilization utilization
within an alternative spectrum sharing model of interference
temperature. Di®erent from these works, our work focuses
on revenue maximization for spectrum holders while con-
sidering both incentive-comparability and interference con-
straints.
There are also studies related to the operation of wire-
less service providers. [22] considers the problem of spec-
trum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary
users. They formulate the problem as an oligopoly market
competition and use a Cournot game to obtain the spectrum
allocation for secondary users. [8] studies the strategies of
wireless service providers in future dynamic spectrum ac-
cess systems, where they need to consider both spectrum
acquisition competition and service provision competition.
In this paper, the spatial reuse of spectrum is considered
and auction is used as the market institution.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a general secondary spectrum
trading framework, and in particular, an auction framework,
for future spectrum holders and wireless service providers.
Under such a framework a primary license holder can sell
access to its unused or under-utilized spectrum resources in
the form of certain ¯ne-grained spectrum-space-time unit.
We motivated such a framework and presented some of the
design principles. How to maximize auction revenue whileenforcing truthful bidding, and how to resolve spectrum in-
terference are two key challenges we addressed in this paper.
We proposed two auctions based on virtual valuation. One
is optimal in revenue generation using the VCG mechanism,
but it has high complexity. The other one uses a greedy like
allocation and payment scheme. It has suboptimal revenue
but is computationally much more e±cient. These auctions
provide primary users su±cient incentive to share their spec-
trum and thus make dynamic spectrum access more practi-
cal. The future work includes extension of the auction model
and related analysis to the other spectrum request formats.
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